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Abstract
Nuclear arms have revolutionized the ways by which human beings are able to
harm one another. Omnipresent in the status quo is a nuclear tension, and whether subtly
or more overtly, this tension underlies a great many international relationships. While
Westphalian paranoia and neorealist power perceptions encourage populations to
continue placing their faith in nuclear umbrellas and deterrence strategies, scholars and
activists increasingly claim that without the realization of universal disarmament,
humanity concedes to the inevitability of future nuclear detonation.
New disarmament initiatives concentrate heavily on the implications of nuclear
weaponry in a sense that supersedes the security of only particular sovereign populations.
Not only are we witnessing a pivot toward a more holistic devotion to the global good,
but we are also seeing increased normative attacks on nuclear legitimacy, as well as a
transition toward international collective security architecture.
The following research utilizes a qualitative, interview-based model and will
discuss disarmament initiatives with a particular concentration on the influence of
globalization on the feasibility of universal disarmament.
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Introduction

“Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of
annihilation.” – Winston Churchill1

We no longer live in the immediate wake of World War II, nor is the Red Scare
any longer at the forefront of our minds. However, the implications of nuclear weapon
technologies are just as vitally important today as they were in the world’s not-so-distant
past. As nuclear weapon technologies have evolved over the past seventy or so years, so
have the justifications for their continued possession. Little Boy and Fat Man laid the
cornerstone on which perceptions of nuclear technologies would forever be built. They
were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively, under very
particular circumstances that American leadership at the time deemed necessitated such
devastation. Likewise, the colossal arms race between the United States and U.S.S.R. was
hinged on strategic circumstance. Threat perceptions born of the devastating nature of
these weapons motivated decades of paranoia, subsequently resulting in massive
armament campaigns. While these weapons have remained more or less dormant in their
silos, submarines, and elsewhere for quite some time, the paradox of their continued
existence is still at the heart of international security policy.
Deterrence theory, to which Winston Churchill referred in 1955, continues to
dominate international security strategies. It is contingent on the comparability of
nuclear strike capabilities between states. In other words, so long as any nuclear first

1
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strike would receive a response of equal or greater magnitude, there is no strategic
incentive for the initial strike to occur. Of course, this is a gross simplification of the
theory itself, but it helps to illustrate the origin of the paradigm of “mutually assured
destruction” (MAD) that deterrence theorists tout as being responsible for the lack of
direct, major power conflict since World War II. Nuclear weapon proponents tool
deterrence theory to “manipulate the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons for public
diplomacy, while falling back on “realist sense” that “we can’t put the genie back into the
bottle” to justify keeping and modernizing their arsenals from one generation to the next.
By dint of constant repetition of “truisms” like this, they foster the belief that nuclear
disarmament is impossible.”2
Increasingly in the status quo is deterrence theory coming under fire. Scholars and
activists are scrutinizing the theory, attempting to discern whether it has any scientific
backing whatsoever. Of course, the answers to this question are mixed. The majority of
neorealist advocates of nuclear weapon possession reference the empirics of recent
history as proof enough that the technologies are stable and that deterrence theory is
functioning properly. Nuclear-armed states gravitate toward these claims, and continue to
modernize and develop current technologies.3 However, as the world continues to
civilize, anti-nuclear weapon activists claim that there are a multitude of alternative
causalities to the lack of major power conflict that we have witnessed since World War
II. They proceed to argue that, in reference to Winston Churchill’s 1955 remarks, it is the
ultimate irresponsibility to remain hostages of terror and annihilation, for we are tempting
fate with each day that we place our lives in the hands of death itself.

2
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Particularly after the public release of multiple “near miss” summaries from the
Cold War, populations are mobilizing in opposition of nuclear weapons technologies.
The lack of absolute human predictability and the simple fact that we as a species are not
immune to mistakes proves the necessity of disarmament. The very creation of nuclear
weapon technologies is a testament to the imperfections of humanity, and these
imperfections, sooner or later, will assuredly manifest in an error that could cost us the
world. The post-Cold War “calm” that is perceived by many in the status quo is no less
than a façade; “the threat posed by nuclear weapons today remains at least as great as it
was before 1989.”4
While disarmament advocates and civil societies are in tireless pursuit of a
nuclear weapon-free world, progress is at a standstill. This standstill largely results from
the very paradox of deterrence theory itself. Peace is only “guaranteed” by deterrence
theory when all nuclear-armed sides possess comparable strike and defense capabilities.
Thus, if one player’s capabilities are ever disadvantaged, a first strike against said player
would no longer be disincentivized. As no nuclear weapon state is willing to risk such a
breach in security, deterrence advocates often explain that states must disarm in a
perfectly synchronized and simultaneous manner, or not at all. “’enforcement’ [for such a
process] remains a critical, underdeveloped issue.”5 The logistical barriers alone make it
nigh impossible, in addition to the simple fact that nuclear weapon posturing remains
highly classified in all nuclear weapon states. The degree of transparency necessary as a

Williams, “Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament.”
Koplow, “You’re Gonna Need a Bigger Boat: Alternatives to the U.N. Security Council for
Enforcing Nuclear Disarmament and Human Rights”
4
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prerequisite to the pursuit of synchronized disarmament could inadvertently advantage
some countries over others in such ways as to break the efficacy of deterrence theory.
Simply put, neorealists and nuclear advocates would adamantly have us believe
that the paradoxical nature of the technology, deterrence theory, and disarmament
requirements ensure that disarmament itself is genuinely impossible.
Gridlock and standstill remain dominant characteristics of nuclear disarmament in
our status quo, but is disarmament as an end state truly as impossible as naysayers would
have the world believe? The discussion herein will attempt to shed light on an ongoing
process that could subvert the perceived necessity of nuclear weapon technologies:
globalization. In other words, is the process of globalization chipping away at status quo
conceptions of security, legitimacy, and nationality in such ways as to make possible
universal disarmament of nuclear weaponry?
While “globalization” is a term often rooted in economic discourse more so than
elsewhere, its implications on the international community are farther reaching than one
would suppose. As the world continues to globalize, we may begin to witness an
unprecedented shift away from traditional neorealist framing of international relations in
an exclusively power-centric way. New factors including the evolution of transnational or
“world” cultures, the establishment of new international norms relating to nuclear
technologies, and the collectivization of security architecture could become focal to the
disarmament debate in the coming years. As globalization facilitates the evolution of
tradition, the impossibilities of the status quo could become more attainable.

9
Literature Review
Relevant publications to the nuclear disarmament debate are innumerable. The
topic itself is expansive, and often cannot be comprehensively understood without
evaluating a whole slew of literature on intimately related and interconnected debates.
The neorealist school of thought from which contemporary power politics are generally
borne saw its genesis in the writings of Kenneth Waltz, particularly “Theory of
International Politics.” The fundamental characteristics of power-centric international
political strategies outlined by the neorealist school are foundational to phenomena of
arms races, and to explaining why disarmament is so strategically suicidal.
Deterrence theory has developed as complimentary to the neorealist framing of
international relations. While not necessarily the first to discuss deterrence theory,
Thomas Schelling’s works “The Strategy of Conflict” in 1960 and “Arms and Influence”
in 1966 are foundational to North American deterrence strategy, and subsequently
promote the continued possession of nuclear weapons out of strategic necessity.
In competition with these works (and others coming from predominantly North
American security institutions like the RAND Institute) are schools devoted more so to
international humanitarian law, disarmament movements, and globalization analysis.
Henry Dunant’s “A Memory of Solferino” is one of the first works on humanitarian law,
and helped to inspire the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross. To
this day, the organization produces IHL analyses that shape contemporary conflict
legitimacy considerations.
Numerous organizations around the world contribute to the pro-disarmament
discussion, among them is the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. This
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organization helped to bring to fruition successes on the disarmament of both cluster
munitions and landmines (with the aid of many other actors). The Geneva Centre for
Security Policy, Acronym Institute, Foundation for Strategic Research, Center for
Security Studies, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and
International Peace Bureau are but a few of many other international and
nongovernmental organizations and think tanks who lend a voice to disarmament
analysis, sometimes on both sides of the debate.
While globalization, much like disarmament, is a massively loaded term,
intricately related to other fields of discussion, John Tomlinson’s “Globalization and
Culture,” and Cees J. Hamelink’s “The Elusive Concept of Globalisation” are important
points of reference on questions of globalization holistically, as well as on more refined
curiosities related to cultural homogenization and transnational cultural identity.
The Ottawa Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) are
important points of reference regarding the discussion of international norm-building and
legitimacy-questioning campaigns. Additionally important to this discussion is a work by
Adam Hochschild called “Bury the Chains.” This work draws parallels between the
evolution of international slave trade legitimacy, and disarmament movements.
Hochschild discusses the establishment of “logics of appropriateness” necessary to
realizing social successes in up-hill political battles.
Finally, Dr. Marc Finaud’s work on cooperative security, “Cooperative Security:
A New Paradigm for a World Without Nuclear Weapons,” outlines many foundational
necessities of a collective framework, strengthened by globalization, that could usher in a
new era of security architecture.

11
Research Methodology
Qualitative research shall comprise the core of this work. While quantitative data
analysis is important to understandings of nuclear arsenals, capabilities, and many of the
implications of globalization on global markets and international relations more
generally, the primary focus herein is on attitudinal and behavioral aspects of the
disarmament discussion. The belief systems on which status quo societies base the
necessity of nuclear weapons are key aspects of this discussion. Additionally important
are the cultural threads within the relational web of this technology. Culture is
exceedingly difficult to quantify and, particularly in a globalizing world, cultural
evolution is difficult to predict. Much like the norms and questions of appropriateness
that shall soon be discussed herein, it is nigh impossible to study these entities and
processes on a tangible level; only their effects are visible.6 Thus, qualitative research and
predictions are the only tools available for conducting research along this particular vein.
Primary data (interviews) shall provide a substantial basis for the conclusions
found herein. Interviewees have been chosen from varied sides of the disarmament
debate, bringing with them a diversity of opinions that shall soon be discussed. Primarily
representing international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, and
other scholarly and educational institutions, the interviewees both individually and
collectively possess immense academic prestige.
While the interviewees selected do not overtly belong to sensitive populations,
ethical considerations played a substantial role in both the recruitment and interview
processes. Ensuring that the well-being of these individuals is comprehensively ensured

6

Interview with Dr. John Borrie of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
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has been an absolute priority throughout research and writing. Steps were taken to ensure
ethical treatment of scholars, including a full disclosure of interview use, and requests to
use stated information (quotations) in the various ways seen in this work. In some cases,
quotation review prior to use was requested, and of course, granted. Scholars were
contacted on an individual basis, with no external influence that could compromise the
freewill of the scholar his/herself. Selection of scholars was largely based on field of
study and relevant expertise. No forms of compensation were provided to the
interviewees, nor were any of their respective colleagues, organizations, or other third
parties involved in the process. Thus, no inappropriate external factors acted coercively in
motivating participation. Lack of anonymity did not concern any interviewees, thus
identities have not been withheld from the discussions herein.

13
Definitions
Cooperative Security: Cooperative security shall be defined as “a process whereby
countries with common interests work jointly through agreed mechanisms to reduce
tensions and suspicion, resolve or mitigate disputes, build confidence, enhance economic
development prospects, and maintain stability in their regions.”7
Cultural Homogenization: Cultural homogenization shall be defined as a process by
which traditional conceptions of nationalism and citizenship become less relevant.
Transnational identity or citizenship is included within this homogenization. The
theoretical end state of this homogenization is universal “global” or “world citizenship.”8
Disarmament: For the purposes of this paper, disarmament shall be used to describe an
end state, and shall be used in reference to nuclear weapon technologies. “As an end
state, disarmament involves eventually establishing a disarmed world.”9
Globalization: Globalization shall be defined as: “economic integration; the transfer of
policies across borders; the transmission of knowledge; cultural stability; the
reproduction, relations, and discourses of power; it is a global process, a concept, a
revolution, and ‘an establishment of the global market free from sociopolitical
control.’10”11

Finaud, “Cooperative Security: A New Paradigm for a World Without Nuclear Weapons?”
Gellner, “Nations and Nationalism: New Perpsectives on the Past.”
9
Borrie and Caughley, “How are Humanitarian Approaches Relevant to Achieving Progress on
Nuclear Disarmament?” p 35.
10
Nikitin, Elliott, “Freedom and the Market (An Analysis of the Anti-globalisation Movement
from the Perspective of the Theoretical Foundation of the Evaluation of the Dynamics of
Capitalism by Palanyi, Hayek and Keynes)” p. 3.
11
Al-Rodhan, Stoudmann “Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a
Proposed Definition” p. 2.
7
8
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International Norm: An international norm shall be defined as a majority acceptance of
a particular tangible or intangible behavior. The unit of analysis contributing to the
“majority” and “minority” evaluations herein shall focus primarily on internationally
recognized states, but may also include individuals, and transnational populations.

15

Analysis

Cultural Homogenization
Systems of sovereignty born of the Westphalian order provide the basis for interstate interaction in the status quo, and the “national identities” that result play “an underacknowledged part in nuclear decision-making.”12 The obligation of sovereign states to
secure their respective citizenries exists today in much the same way that it has passively
existed since the advent of sovereignty. Today, however, lines are beginning to blur ever
so slightly. Is a state exclusively obligated to protect and secure only its own citizenry, or
does its obligation extend to larger world priorities? Should people look to the sovereign
state of which they are citizens solely for the protection of their own, or should they
expect and demand global protections that know no geopolitical boundary? More so in
the status quo than ever before in history, globalization is prompting these extrospective
inquiries, and national and cultural identities are becoming less explicit.
While “Globalization is often considered in economic terms […] it also
encompasses technological, political and cultural change.”13 The cultural and political
aspects of this globalization-prompted change are exceedingly important to the future of
nuclear disarmament initiatives. Status quo nuclear culture is dominated by realist and
neorealist power perceptions. These are the driving force behind deterrence theory and
strive to convince populations of the necessity of nuclear weapon technologies for the

12
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realization of securitization priorities, all based on relative power disparities between
sovereign states. They perpetuate the “us” versus “them” nationalistic and cultural
rhetoric on which weaponization has always been based. Stone, spear, sword, bow, gun,
tank, nuclear bomb; despite variation in complexity, these are all means to the same end.
The creation of these weapons, as many realist theorists will explain, is
unidirectional. “We, scientists, humanity, know the destructiveness of nuclear weapons
and how to produce them. They cannot be un-invented.”14 Disarmament naysayers will
persistently cite this uni-directionality as proof enough the disarmament can never be
achieved. They claim that there will always be a cheater; there will always be someone
who threatens development, thus locking the world in a perpetual paranoia that ensures
continued investment in deterrence infrastructure. The nuclear box has been opened, they
say, and it will never close.
However, these arguments against the feasibility of disarmament assume not only
uni-directionality of invention, but also culture as a constant rather than a variable. This is
where globalization becomes oh so relevant to the discussion. According to Dr. Goran
Jovanovic of the International Institute of Geneva, “if you start to manufacture a stick, a
sword, a rifle, or a nuclear device it is because you have an image of the enemy in your
mind. What if you did not have this image? The weapons we have created are not so
much the problem, but this ‘otherness’.”15 Attitudinal perceptions of other human beings
based on cultural variation and geopolitical factors that we perceive culminate in the fear
mongering that causes the first stone to be cast. “What if in your own mind you do not

14

Interview with Dr. Goran Jovanovic of the International Institute of Geneva, Friday, September
18, 2015.
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Interview with Dr. Jovanovic, September 18, 2015.
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define the other as your ‘hostis’, but your ‘frater’ or ‘soror’?”16 What if a more
cosmopolitan culture17 could grow in place of the territorialized one in which we
currently live?
Of course disarmament critics would likely scoff at this idea, dismissing it as a
utopian fantasy. To some extent, they would be absolutely right. There is no way to
simply fiat the cultural and psychological shifts that would be necessary for some
fantastical version of global peace to be achieved. Luckily, there is no need to for
ludicrous fiat when the process of globalization is already cultivating a political and
social climate the likes of which is slowly merging populations culturally.
Youth growth and development is of particular importance to this process, as we
see a general trend in liberalization as new generations mature and older generations fade.
Youth citizenship today, more than historically seen, is of a transnational nature.18 In fact,
“the notion of youth as unformed citizens is embedded in developmental assumptions
about youth that actually tie youth culture […] to globalization.”19 As explained by Dr.
Jovanovic, “globalization is a matrix of ideas” and these ideas socialize and educate
populations in a generally constant direction.20 He specifically cited information
technologies and communication leading to the establishment of the first realm defined
by global citizenship, particularly among youth: the internet. On the internet, there are no
passports, no visas, nor travel restrictions. It is a realm of equal opportunity and
communication. When one connects to the internet, his or her geopolitical culture and

16
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nationality are temporarily suspended, and he or she is assimilated into the singular,
world culture.21 While this cultural homogenization takes place in a largely intangible
realm, “a spillover effect from one dimension to the other” has already been seen,
resulting in a “spiral of development rather than a linear one” in the tangible realm.22
It is important to note that this process is not one that will likely yield results in
years or decades, rather it is trans-generational.23 Even still, cultural homogenization is
beginning to re-categorize foreign nationals in our minds. At an almost unrecognizably
slow pace (such is the nature of worldwide cultural reformation) we are beginning to
witness a unification, a homogenization of cultures that will combat traditional and
historical conceptions of words like “foreign,” “other,” and “enemy.” These are the first
steps toward a globalized, singular culture24 that homogenization promotes.
Granted, the digital aspect of this process meets challenges in censorship-prone
states, and when there exists little access to free and unadulterated information
technologies. Very necessary players to the nuclear disarmament process are among the
states lagging behind in the allowance of free-flowing information, North Korea being a
prime example. However, if recent history is any indicator, we can see that radical
grassroots movements can transform a state and result in spontaneous leaps in
globalization. The Arab Spring illustrated this process of minor participation in the global
conversation suddenly exploding into massive movements, fuelled largely by globalized
communication, and culminating in geopolitical transformations.

Kirby, “Sociology in Perspective,” p. 407-408.
Interview with Dr. Jovanovic, September 18, 2015.
23
Interview with Dr. Jovanovic, September 18, 2015.
24
Jennings, “Globalizations and the Ancient World,” p. 132.
21
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“It takes time for global citizenship or consciousness to emerge, but it is
happening.”25 Once cultures have homogenized to such an extent that nationalistic greatpower paranoia and hostilities are no longer majority perceptions, we may socially evolve
into the circumstances necessary for nuclear disarmament to become less of a fantasy,
and more a demand of every voice.

International Norm Development
Somewhat related to the discussion of cultural homogenization, but distinct in an
important way, is the spread of norms and the diffusion of beliefs encouraged by
globalization. I am no longer referencing the blurring of national identity or
psychological reformation of the “us versus them” paradigms under which we currently
live. Rather than discussing a homogenization of identity, I will now concentrate on the
process of homogenizing norms, even in a world in which national identities and
“enemy” rhetoric still exist.
Even within distinct societies with distinct cultural identities, globalization helps
to facilitate the spread of norms and the establishment of “universally held” beliefs.
Sovereign security obligations and the continuation of hostile foreign perceptions are not
mutually exclusive to international norm building efforts that could delegitimize nuclear
weapons to such an extent as to persuade disarmament. As explained by Dr. John Borrie
of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), “a lot of the
behavior of states seems not to be driven by this Melian dialogue style, rationalistmaterialist logic that the powerful do what they want and the rest of us do what we must.

25
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A logic of appropriateness actually applies to a lot of behavior and often states act in
ways that reflect a belief that the opinions of others matter. That’s the leverage that the
nuclear disarmament movement has.”26
Despite the circular debate that justifies continued and necessary possession of
nuclear weapons by states, disarmament as a terminal condition is certainly not
impossible so long as those in power are susceptible to normative social pressures. The
success of the Ottawa Treaty in the banning of anti-personnel mines represents a great
victory for campaigners utilizing norm-building strategies to motivate changes in great
power behavior. While the United States has yet to sign the treaty, it has still been
pressured to abide by the treaty’s terms. This proves “that we can affect the actions of
even the most powerful by establishing a clear standard for what’s considered acceptable
and unacceptable.”27 The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) is a second prime
example of a norm building initiative. While a handful of great powers are not yet
member to the CCM, it has put pressure on possessors of cluster munitions, burdening
them with international scrutiny and necessitating that additional evaluation and thought
be put into the continued possession and use of these arms.
Norm building is not restricted by the sorts of trans-generational evolutionary
timelines as are processes of cultural homogenization. In fact, Dr. Borrie of UNIDIR
explained that he certainly has not “seen the emergence of some global class of people
who consider themselves global citizens” (the hopeful, yet ambitious end-goal of
transnational identity shifts and cultural homogenization). However, “if you look at the
evolution of [norm building] campaigns, new technologies that we associate with

26
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globalization have made them more agile,”28 and there are empirical success stories
including those discussed previously.
While Dr. Borrie, among others, does not believe that globalization “necessarily
make[s] a decisive difference to disarmament,”29 it seems evident that at least some
indirect relationship exists between the international phenomenon and disarmament
initiatives. If only for its ameliorating of the coordination and collective action problems
that plague social movements and campaigns, globalization is influencing the efficacy of
disarmament efforts. Non-nuclear actors by definition are less powerful than nuclear
weapon-armed actors. A pro-disarmament collective voice is necessary to narrow the
power disparity, and globalization is necessary to this collectivization. In a similar
fashion as cultural homogenization, if a bit faster, with time will come unification, and
with unification will come the delegitimization necessary to prompt nuclear weapon state
(NWS) support.

Cooperative Security Architecture
In the status quo, security frameworks are exceedingly reliant on nuclear
deterrents and national priorities. While nuclear weapon states are certainly dependent on
these frameworks, those with security guarantees under one nuclear umbrella or another
also have vested interests in their preservation. Despite these narrowly focused security
objectives, in truth, “there is no such thing as national security, there is only international
or collective security. The alternative is collective insecurity.”30

28
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In a world in which disarmament is imminent as a result of evolving international
relationships, erecting a new security doctrine to replace the old will be essential, and “as
a prerequisite […] we will have to see a transition to collective and globalized power.”31
In whisperingly subtle ways, this transition has already begun, and is helping to usher in
the new doctrine and guide its construction on the foundations of international
organizations that operate today.
Dr. Marc Finaud of the Geneva Centre for Security policy explained that “a new
paradigm should […] reconcile nuclear powers’ security doctrines with global aspirations
for a safer world, and ensure that nuclear powers derive their security less from others’
insecurity but from mutually beneficial cooperative security.”32 In this way, a transition
away from the fear tactics referenced by Winston Churchill in 1955 could occur.
Neorealist concerns within a system of collectivization of security interests and dispute
settlement will likely revolve around the loss of relative power advantage over
competitors. However, if the smallest unit of measurement for populations in need of
security were to be all humans rather than exclusively the humans living within a
particular geopolitical swath of land, then these relative power disparities would matter
much less.
This argument goes back to the discussion of cultural homogenization and
transnational identities, and I am fully aware that it is starkly contrary to the power
politics that have dominated international discussions for decades. Yes, the zero-sum
paradigm of relative power relations is well established in the status quo; its roots have
dug deep psychologically as well as in regard to investment and infrastructure. However,
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“globalization and subsequent reductions in nationalism can make domestic barriers to
disarmament less difficult to overcome,” particularly when new “mechanisms,
negotiations, and security architectures”33 are brought to fruition to fill the void that
nuclear technologies will leave behind upon their departure. In order to make greater the
likelihood of success, new collective security architecture must accompany cultural
homogenization, and vice versa. If one of the two components is missing from the
equation, the other will be unlikely to function properly.
Globalization has already begun to roughly form institutions in which collective
security architectures may grow and flourish. It “is happening in a creeping way that we
don’t necessarily realize,” and “if you compare the current US strategy with the previous
one, already we see some change.” The strategies (multilateral sanctions, joint pressures,
etc.) that helped to pave the way for the Iran Nuclear Deal, as well as the deal itself,
illustrate ways in which security architecture in the status quo has already begun to shift
away from the less collective and more violent architectures of the past. In reference to
the deal, Dr. Finaud of GCSP said, “it may be minute, but if the most powerful nuclear
state in the world is increasing reliance on alternative instruments and responses to
conflict, you have a shift.”34 The alternative instruments to which he referenced include
negotiations, sanctions, and multilateral consultations, among others. By increasing
investment and effort allocated to these alternative and globalized dispute settlement
tools and by contributing to the strengthening of the globalized institutions that make
them effective, the status quo will see the transition in security architecture necessary to
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break the paradox of deterrence theory and phase out nuclear weapons in a safe,
controlled manner.

Criticism and Status Quo Infeasibility
Of course, while transnational identity shifts, evolving international norms, and
recent trends toward collective security architecture are representative of baby-steps
toward a potential future devoid of nuclear-armed actors, critics are certainly not in short
supply. Not all of these critics are necessarily opposed to the idea of definitive nuclear
disarmament (some are) rather, they claim to represent a pragmatism that educates us on
the impossibility of such a goal.
“Rationality” is a very tricky word when it comes to both the possession of
nuclear weapons and the potential for disarmament. Deterrence theorists would claim that
the rationality of nuclear actors ensures the unlikelihood of a nuclear first-strike because
of an understanding of the implications. Humanitarians would claim that rationality
should motivate disarmament because of an understanding of the potential for
miscalculation and accidents, among other risks. Still others argue claim that nuclear
disarmament is entirely unfeasible because of the rationality of sovereign populations and
of political actors that govern them. The word is tooled by each distinct party to the
debate, making it difficult to discern what truly is the rational course of action.
As explained by Dr. Vautravers of the Swiss Military Review, the Geneva Centre
for Strategic Studies, and the University of Geneva, “The U.K. considers itself to have
the fourth most effective armed forces. If it loses nuclear weapons […] it does not fall to
6 or 7, it probably falls to number 14, or worse. An ordinary citizen in the UK is not
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prepared to say, ‘oh yes, we don’t mind going from number 4 to number 14.’”35 The
leaderboard of military capability is extremely interconnected with ideals of national
identity, Dr. Vautravers continued. Advocacy for disarmament in the United Kingdom
would be akin to advocacy for the abolition of the U.K. university system or advocacy for
the discontinuation of the brain drain.36
As a “rational” population that wishes to maintain relatively meaningful military
capabilities, it simply would not make sense for British citizens to support a disarmament
initiative. The nature of military strength that is directly proportional to nuclear weapon
capabilities is a particularly daunting barrier in democratic nuclear weapon states. The
accountability of government to these “rational” citizenries, whose identities and
perceptions of security depend on nuclear weapons, prevents the serious consideration of
any disarmament initiative.
“Rational” anticipation of governments and politicians results in much the same
lack of genuine consideration for disarmament efforts. Because of democratic
accountability, no rational political actor would advocate for such a vastly unpopular
initiative. Setting aside for a moment the entire debate on miscalculation/accident risks,
deterrence theory, nuclear umbrellas, and all else, perceptions held by populations within
democracies and subsequent platform alignments geared toward political selfpreservation make impossible achieving nuclear disarmament as an end state. In context
with the status quo from which globalization is facilitating our departure, Dr. Vautravers
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explained that “the global zero initiative is a failure, it’s ridiculous. We know where it
comes from, but it’s not on the table.”37
Absolutely, barriers such as these stop disarmament initiatives dead in their tracks
given current political climates. However, if processes of globalization continue to
homogenize diverse populations, foster widely and deeply supported anti-nuclear norms,
and provide a new security architecture to which states may transition, current barriers
could be entirely redressed from the ground up. The grievance of citizenries could
effectually be turned on its head. The rationality of political actors, then, would motivate
support for the pursuit of a global zero.
Conclusion
Globalization is a complex and multi-faceted organism. Its worldwide
implications include those of a social, economic, cultural, and political nature. Nuclear
weapon technologies are comparably impactful. Status quo scholars and activists with
nuclear weapon expertise will be among the first to explain that the social and cultural
controversy surrounding these technologies shrouds their future in uncertainty. In a
paradoxical fashion, rationality is touted both as a justification for advocacy for these
weapons, and as a justification for their dismantlement. In short, we find ourselves today
trying to traverse a “rock and a hard place” debate, with no way to accommodate the
imperatives demanded by the multiple juxtaposed camps.
Disarmament critics are right; we have not yet reached a turning point at which a
global zero initiative is in any form feasible. This is certainly disheartening, particularly
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given the world’s precarious position on the edge of the nuclear knife that defines status
quo security architecture. However, there is certainly hope.
Borne of globalization, a trifecta of transformations will soon change the rules by
which the disarmament game is played. As mentioned heretofore, globalization and
subsequent processes are of human origin, but are neither of conscious human design nor
are they under conscious human control. As a result, the perfect predictability of the
speed at which they will effect tangible change is nigh impossible.
More definitive, however, are the ways by which these processes will help to
facilitate nuclear arms reductions and an eventual global zero. This is the world I see: As
transnational identities grow more numerous and cultures homogenize with increasing
rapidity, Westphalian sovereignty and the need to securitize in a starkly geopolitical
sense will lose relevance. Evolving international norms and “logics of appropriateness”
will catalyze a new, systematic necessity to disarmament. Finally, the collectivization of
security will ensure a smooth transition from the old defense paradigm to the new, one
devoid of nuclear weapons and all the more stable as a result.
The status quo is hostile to idea of this sequence of events. Those of a more
traditional adherence use “unrealistic,” or “borderline utopian” to describe it. However,
idealism is just that until it is realized. The status quo is beginning to see the first hints of
this process’ realization, and the subtleties of globalization will be culprits to the creation
of this new system.
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CCM: Convention on Cluster Munitions
GCSP: Geneva Centre for Security Policy
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
IHL: International Humanitarian Law
MAD: Mutually Assured Destruction
NWS: Nuclear Weapon State
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UN: United Nations
UNIDIR: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
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